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GLD-088       NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 12-4014 
 ___________ 
 
JAMES COPPEDGE, 
                       Appellant 
 
v. 
 
CITY OF PHILADELPHIA, JAMES C. VANDERMARK, ASSISTANT CITY SOLICITOR 
FOR: JOAN DECKER, COMMISSIONER OF DEEDS; LEONARD B. ZUCKERMAN, ESQ., 
ATTORNEY FOR HOMESTEAD, INC. AN ARM OF J.P. MORGAN CHASE;  
ANDREW L. MARKOWITZ, ESQ., ATTORNEY FOR J.P. MORGAN CHASE 
 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. Civil No. 2:12-cv-01917) 
 District Judge:  Honorable Thomas N. O'Neill 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted for Possible Summary Action  
 Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
December 28, 2012 
 
 Before:  FUENTES, FISHER and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
 (Opinion filed: February 14, 2013 ) 
 _________ 
 
 OPINION 
 _________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 James Coppedge appeals the District Court’s dismissal of his claims and its denial 
of his motions for recusal and reconsideration.  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
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§ 1291, and our review is generally de novo, see Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 
41 (3d Cir. 2011), although we review recusal and reconsideration decisions for abuse of 
discretion.  See Delalla v. Hanover Ins., 660 F.3d 180, 183 n.2 (3d Cir. 2011); Lazaridis 
v. Wehmer, 591 F.3d 666, 669 (3d Cir. 2010).  We may affirm the District Court on any 
ground supported by the record.  EEOC v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 930 F.2d 329, 
331 (3d Cir. 1991). 
 Coppedge’s filings are not easily deciphered.  To the extent that he directly 
challenges a state-court judgment pertaining to a mortgage foreclosure action, we agree 
with the District Court that, for substantially the same reasons discussed below, 
Coppedge’s attack is barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.1
 Ordinarily, a pro se plaintiff must be given leave to amend his complaint if it is 
vulnerable to a motion to dismiss.  Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 114 
(3d Cir. 2002).  “Among the grounds that could justify a denial of leave to amend are 
  See Great W. Mining & 
Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 166 (3d Cir. 2010) (prohibiting 
actions where “the plaintiff is inviting the district court to review and reject the state 
judgments”).  Alternatively, to the extent that Coppedge’s filings, when construed 
liberally, allege claims that survive Rooker-Feldman scrutiny, see Lance v. Dennis, 546 
U.S. 459, 464 (2006) (per curiam), we conclude that he has failed to articulate sufficient 
facts to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.  See Burtch v. Milberg Factors, 
Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 225 (3d Cir. 2011). 
                                                 
1 D.C. Ct. of App. v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 
U.S. 413 (1923). 
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undue delay, bad faith, dilatory motive, prejudice, and futility.”  Shane v. Fauver, 213 
F.3d 113, 115 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 
1410, 1434 (3d Cir. 1997)).  Based on Coppedge’s filings both below and in this Court, 
which are at best unresponsive to judicial requests, we have no trouble concluding that 
affording additional leave to amend would be futile. 
 Finding no abuse of discretion in the denial of recusal or reconsideration, and 
finding no substantial question presented in general by this appeal, we will summarily 
affirm.  See Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam); see also 
3d Cir. LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6. 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
